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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

defense, provided the application contains provisions expressly
limiting the power of the agent to bind his company by his acts
and representations.8 Such a limitation has been ignored 7 or rejected8 by the state courts as running counter to the principle
that one may not exempt himself by contract from the fraud of
his agent.9
There is the faint suggestion in the principal case that its
outcome might have accorded with the federal rule, had there been
restrictive covenants in the application limiting the agent's authority as auditor or recorder of answers to questions. 10 Under
prior West Virginia decisions," however, it would seem that the
result here reached is desirable even in the presence of such limitations on the agent's authority. The fact that applicants for insurance regard the signing of the application as a matter of form
and rely upon the superior knowledge and good faith of the agent
justifies the placing of'the risk of the agent's misconduct upon
the company.

INSURANCE--WAIvER OF CONDITION AFTER LOSS-AUTHORITY
OF FirE INSURANCE ADJUSTER. - Plaintiff seeks to collect an in-

surance policy for loss occasioned by fire resulting from use of a
gasoline flatiron. A clause rendered policy void if gasoline was
kept or used on the premises. Special agent and adjuster, though
the policy expressly withheld power to waive written stipulation
of policy, orally promised to pay the loss. Held, that power to
waive orally cannot be inferred from agent's title alone where
expressly withheld, and insured is bound by her contract and has
a New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 S. Ct. 837 (1886);
W. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 92 Fed. 503 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); Hubbard v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 80 Fed. 681 (C. C. R. I., 1891); Maryland
Casualty v. Campbell, 255 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919).
7 Foi a full collection of cases and note dealing with the application of the
federal rule, see (1906) 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607. Also see (1915) 53 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 273.
8 See supra n. 7. Also see Foster v. Pioneer Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 37 Wash.
288, 79 Pac. 798 (1905); Leisen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 20 N. D11
316, 127 N. W. 837 (1910).
9 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 445.

10 The West Virginia court states the rule as being applicable in the absence of restrictive covenants upon the agent's authority.
11 Earlier West Virginia cases hold the company bound by the knowledge
of the agent. See McCall v. Phoenix Mutual Ins. Co.; Medley v. German
Alliance Ins. Co., both supra n. 1.
That the company may not escape liability for the acts and representations
of their agents by provisions in the policy, see Deitz v. Insurance Co., 31 W.
Va. 851, 8 S. E. 616 (1888).
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no right of action against insurer for a loss caused by the risk
expressly excepted. Judgment for plaintiff reversed and remanded. Bailey v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of W. Va.'
The clause prohibiting gasoline on the insured premises appears as a condition, 2 and, if violated, renders the policy void.
If, on breach of the condition, the policy by force of its own
language was void, the insured, regardless of loss, might set up
the invalidity and recover premiums paid subsequent to breach."
The authorities generally hold, however, that a breach of such
clause renders the policy voidable rather than-void.4 In case the
condition was broken temporarily and a loss subsequent to the
termination of such breach occurred, some courts have been prone
to let the insurer off, unless the policy had been revived;5 however, since considerable hardship to the insured resulted from such
an interpretation,6 other courts have held that the policy was
temporarily suspended during the breach, 7 and, provided such
breach did not contribute proximately to the loss, they have permitted recovery."
In the instant case, 9 since the policy was voidable, 10 the comI Bailey v. Mutual Eire Ins. Co. of W. Va., 182 S. E. 288 (W. Va. 1935).
2 VI CE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 336, 405.
8 Langmaid, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law in California (1931)
20 CA I . L. RBv. 1.
4 Professor Williston says, I"Where any possible benefit can accrue to the
party for whose benefit the provision is made, by keeping the contract in
force, there seems no doubt of the propriety of this construction for it cannot
have been the intention of the parties that by failing to perform a condition,
one who should perform it can free himself from liability."
WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1931) § 746, p. 1420. VANCE, INsURANCE 695. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co. v. Zillman, 68 W. Va. 272, 69 S. E. 855 (1910).
5 German Ins. Co. v. Russel, 65 Ran. 373, 69 Pac. 345, 58 L. R. A. 234
(1902); Morkan v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 383, 179 Pac. 330, 3
A. L. R. 794 (1919); Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 149 Mass.
116, 21 N. E. 361, 3 L. R. A. 508 (1889).
6 This permits insurer to retain the full premium, a part of which is unearned, and also enables him to take advantage -of an unsuspected forfeiture
through an innocent violation of the condition, though at most' it is trivial
and wholly unconnected with the fire. Beecher v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
90 Vt. 347, 98 Atl. 917 (1916).
7 McClure v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,' 242 Pa. 59, 88 Atl. 921 (1913); COOLEY,
BRAs ON INsumaNe (2d ed. 1927) 2933.
8 Putnam v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 4 Fed. 753 (1880); Sumter Tobacco
Whse. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. Ltd. of London, 76 S. C. 76, 56 S. E. 654
(1907). Some courts have gone farther and, where the broken condition contributed to the loss, permitted recover. See: Springfield Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Wade, 95 Tex. 598, 68 S. W. 977; L. R. A. 1917C 278 (1902); Home
Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Bridges, 172 Ky. 161, 189 S. W. 6 (1916).
9Supra n. 1.
i1 In order to retain the business of the insured and build up good will

in the community, an insurer is often willing to waive a broken colldition.
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pany could, by waiver uns.upported by a consideration, 1 extinguish
its power or privilege to set up the-breach of condition. 12 Some
courts seem to have been zealous, however, in finding evidence of
a waiver, either by word or act.' 3 It would seem that the question
should turn wholly on the authority of the agent who waived the
breach; and that the burden of proving the agent's authority as
well as the fact of waiver is on the insured. 1 A clause in the
policy withholding from agents the power to waive a written condition, although limiting the apparent or ostensible authority of
agents, would not prevent a general agent,'5 or a special agent
having actual authority, 6 or a subordinate agent whose powers
have subsequently been extended by the conduct of the insurer, 7
from binding the insurer by waiving a condition.'
West Virginia has held that under such a limiting clause an
adjuster without special authority cannot waive a condition in
the policy; 9 however, if the adjuster is actually authorized to settle and adjust claims there is apparently no reason why, as incidental thereto, he would not have authority to waive the broken
condition.20 Since there is grave danger of collusion between the
insured and an adjuster after a loss, policy would seem to dictate
that the result of the West Virginia court in the instant case is
" When waivers require consideration. See VANCE, INSURACE 481.
12 Some courts and writers designate this as an election rather than a waiver;
for a criticism of the election theory, see VANCE, INSURAN.CE 463.
"3Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., 149 Minn. 118, 182 N. W. 991
(1921) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lahr, 192 id. 613, 134 N. E. 657 (1922);
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kubman, 58 Neb. 488, 78 N. W. 936 (1899). 7
COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 4448. Note (1923) 22 A. L. R. 407.
14 Chambers v. Great State Council, 76 W. Va. 614, 86 S. E. 467 (1915);
Kearney v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 609 (1903); Quinlan v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 356, 31 N. E. 31, 33 (1882).
'a Coles v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 41 W. Va. 261, 23 S. E. 732 (1895); 5
COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 4014 et seq.
16 The Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. MeMillen, 24 Ohio St. 67 (1873).
'7 Wolfe v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co., 113 W. Va. 884, 170 S. E. 182 (1933);
Coles v. Jefferson Ins. Co., supra n. 15.
is Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234, 24 L. Ed. 689
(1877); Bartlett v. Stanchfield, 148 Mass. 394, 395, 19 N. E. 549, 650
(1889). See VANCE, INSURANCE 434.
"0 Bond v. National Fire Ins. Co.,
77 W. Va. 736, 88 S. E. 389 (1916);
Slater v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 68 W. Va. 779, 71 S. E. 197 (1910).
See also Medley v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 55 W. Va. 342, 47 S. E. 101

(1904); 5

CoOLEY,

20 Langmaid,

BRIEFS ON INSURANCE 4011 et seq.

Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law - The Agency Problems, 21 CALIF. L. REv. 91, 108 (1933); Roberts, Willis & Taylor Co. v. Sun
Mutual Ins. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 35 S. W. 955 (1896); Dick v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 46, 65 N. W. 742 (1896); 5 COOLEk,
BREFS ON INSURANCE 3987.
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sound, as the plaintiff apparently failed to establish the authority
21
of the agent to waive the breach of the condition.
The statutory form22 of the standard fire policy avoids many
of the difficulties of the above clause as it omits the word "void"
and inserts the following clause:
"This company shall not be liable for loss or damage
occurring . . . . while there is kept, used or allowed on the
described premises . . . . gasoline . ."
The effect of the statutory form is to make the clause an exception
rather than a condition, as in the instant case. Should the agent,
after loss, attempt to waive this clause, an insured would have to
prove not only the agent's authority, but also a valid supporting
consideration, because such a waiver in effect would create an
23
entirely new contract.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS INDENTURE

-

FORECLOSURE OF CORPORATE TRUST

POWER OF EQUITY COURT TO DISREGARD CONTRACT

RIGHTS OF MAJORITY BONDHOLDERS. - Following default in payment of interest and principal by defendant theatre corporation,
plaintiffs as trustees for a large bond issue sought foreclosure by
a court of equity in accordance with the provisions of the trust
indenture.' The amended bill prayed for a receivership and for
21 Plaintiff's witness (defendant's secretary) testified without contradiction
that the agent had no authority to bind the defendant in this manner. See
supra n. 19.
22 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 33, art. 4, § 7.
23 McCoy v. N. W. Mut. Relief Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R.
A. 681 (1896).
1 In the ordinary case of default in bonded indebtedness, the trustee for
the bondholders usually institutes suit to foreclose the mortgage security.
Thereafter, certain individuals offer themselves as a Protective Committee for
the bondholders, this bbing arranged often by the debtor's bankers or by the
issuing house. The Protective Committee then invites deposit of the bonds,
by the bondholders, those depositing passing thereby to the committee legal
title and complete authority to act in foreclosure proceedings. There is retained by the depositors simply equitable title, evidenced by the certificate
of deposit issued by the committee. Frequently, nearly all bondholders in
this fashion turn over their holdings: in any event, a decided majority can
normally be obtained without much effort. Eventually, at the subsequent
foreclosure sale, a representative of the Protective Committee bids in the
property at the upset figure fixed by the equity court. While the old bonds can
be applied partially on the purchase price, new money has to be raised by the
committee to take care of expenses of the suit, (including fees for the trustee
and counsel, and court costs), and to pay off in cash the non-assenting minority bondholders. Of course by assessment proportionately against the de-
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